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Abstract
Contingency-theorists have gestured to a series of phenomena such as random muta-
tions or rare Armageddon-like events as that which accounts for evolutionary contin-
gency. These phenomena constitute a class, which may be aptly called the ‘sources 
of contingency’. In this paper, I offer a probabilistic conception of what it is to be a 
source of contingency and then examine two major candidates: chance variation and 
genetic drift, both of which have historically been taken to be ‘chancy’ in a number 
of different senses. However, contra the gesturing of contingency-theorists, chance 
variation and genetic drift are not always strong sources of contingency, as they can 
be non-chancy (and hence, directional) in at least one sense that opposes evolution-
ary contingency. The probabilistic conception offered herein allows for sources of 
contingency to appropriately vary in strength. To this end, I import Shannon’s infor-
mation entropy as a statistical measure for systematically assessing the strength of 
a source of contingency, which is part and parcel of identifying sources of contin-
gency. In brief, the higher the entropy, the greater the strength. This is also empiri-
cally significant because molecular, mutational, and replicative studies often contain 
sufficient frequency or probability data to allow for entropies to be calculated. In 
this way, contingency-theorists can evaluate the strength of a source of contingency 
in real-world cases. Moreover, the probabilistic conception also makes conceptual 
room for the converse of sources of contingency: ‘sources of directionality’, which 
ought to be recognised, as they can interact with genuine sources of contingency in 
undermining evolutionary contingency.
Keywords Evolutionary contingency · Sources of contingency · Sources of 
directionality · Chance variation · Random mutations · Genetic drift · Information 
entropy
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Introduction
There is, presently, no consensus as to what evolutionary contingency amounts 
to. Minimally, the idea is that evolutionary outcomes could have been otherwise. 
Perhaps, had the evolutionary past been different, then present or future evolu-
tionary outcomes would have been different. Or, perhaps, the biological natural 
laws allow for a multiplicity of possible outcomes—in other words, the biological 
natural laws underdetermine the evolutionary outcome.
A number of contingency-theorists have attempted to characterise, or offer an 
account of, evolutionary contingency by satisfying a range of desiderata, such as 
(1) being faithful to Gould (1989), (2) concordance with macroevolutionary data, 
(3) emphasising the importance of history, and (4) avoiding tension with indeter-
minism. Beatty (2006, 2016, 2017) has suggested that evolutionary outcomes can 
be ‘contingent per se’ (formerly, the unpredictability sense). Powell (2009, 2012) 
and Powell and Mariscal (2015) have suggested that evolutionarily contingent 
outcomes are ones that are ‘sensitive to initial conditions’. Desjardins (2011a, 
b, 2016) has argued that evolutionarily contingent outcomes are ‘path depend-
ent’. And, more recently, Wong (2020a) has argued that evolutionarily contingent 
outcomes have non-trivial objective probabilities in some to be defined ‘modal 
range’.
Despite the lack of consensus, contingency-theorists have proceeded to gesture to 
a series of phenomena ranging from processes central to modern evolutionary the-
ory, like genetic drift or random mutations, to rare Armageddon-like events as what 
accounts for evolutionary contingency. These phenomena constitute a class, which 
may be aptly called the ‘sources of contingency’. The idea is that these phenom-
ena lead to evolutionarily contingent outcomes in virtue of some inherent chanci-
ness. However, it is not clear what a ‘source of contingency’ is, nor which sense of 
chance is invoked. With two exceptions (i.e. McConwell 2019; Wong 2020b), there 
has been little beyond mere gesturing at possible sources of contingency, resulting in 
a noticeable paucity of systematic investigation into this class of phenomena.
In this paper, I offer a probabilistic conception of a ‘source of contingency’. The 
idea is that, for any given biological process that admits of multiple possible out-
comes, there is an array of possible outcomes, each with a varying objective prob-
ability that, altogether, sum to 1. But, depending on features of the possible outcome 
array, a source of contingency can be said to be stronger or weaker. In fact, sources 
of contingency account for varying levels of evolutionary contingency precisely by 
entailing differently shaped probability distributions. For instance, a source of con-
tingency is strongest when there is a uniform distribution whereby there is absolutely 
no probability bias towards any particular outcome (i.e. the state of equiprobability). 
This is intuitive, as all possible outcomes have an equal probability of occurence, 
and it is highly uncertain which one will occur. However, as the probability dis-
tribution diverges from uniformity, the source of contingency becomes weaker. In 
this case, there is an outcome that has a relatively greater objective probability than 
(some of) its alternatives in the possible outcome array, and the source is said to be 
weak. After all, there was one outcome that was relatively more probable to occur.
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The modern synthesis prescribes two obvious candidates for strong sources of 
contingency: the group of evolutionary factors known as (1) ‘chance variation’, and 
the group of evolutionary factors known as (2) ‘genetic drift’.1 Despite previous, 
extensive philosophical discussions of these two groups of factors in the philoso-
phy of biology (e.g. Beatty 1984, 2002, 2004, 2006; Brandon 2006; Lennox 2015; 
Millstein 1997, 2002; Sober 1984; Walsh et al. 2002), there is still much ambiguity 
in both terms. The former is an antiquated term employed by Darwin and his con-
temporaries to refer to evolutionary material, upon which natural selection acts, that 
is generated in a supposedly non-directed fashion in contradistinction to the alterna-
tive of the day—Lamarckism.2 For whilst Lamarck thought that the generation of 
variation was continually directed at improving forms and the perpetuation of those 
variations neutral, Darwin took the converse view in that he thought evolution was 
proceeded by a non-chancy, selective process (i.e. natural selection) acting on vari-
ations generated by chance (Lennox 2015). It was, however, not clear what Darwin 
meant by ‘chance’, nor what he meant by ‘variation’.
Fortunately, the modern synthesis progressed on both fronts. Firstly, within the 
modern synthesis tradition, ‘variation’ was taken to be chiefly genetic ever since 
Fisher’s The Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inher-
itance (1918). Secondly, modern synthesis authors took these processes to be 
‘chancy’ in the sense that they were random with respect to fitness (e.g. Haldane 
1930; Dobzhansky 1970). That is—mutation and recombination do not occur in 
response to any adaptive benefit they may incur. Despite the general acceptance of 
this sense of chance amongst practicing biologists, other interpretations occasionally 
crop up in the modern biological literature. This is, as we shall see, partly owing to 
the fact that certain empirical findings have brought the modern synthesis sense of 
chance into serious question.
As for genetic drift, Beatty described it as a “heterogenous concept” (1992) of 
disparate processes and outcomes. These processes and outcomes, not without con-
troversy, include (but are not limited to): (1) indiscriminate parent sampling, (2) 
indiscriminate gamete sampling, (3) sampling error, (4) the Sewall-Wright effect, 
(5) the founder effect, and, (6) the Hagedorn effect (Fisher 1930; Walsh et al. 2002). 
However, what seems to unite all these processes and outcomes under the same 
header of ‘drift’ is some “notion of chance” (Walsh et al. 2002).
Part of the trouble, however, is that the notion of chance, itself, is deeply ambigu-
ous. Within the concepts of genetic drift and chance variation alone, there are, at 
least, seven distinct senses of chance at play (Millstein 2011). As we shall see, some 
senses of chance stipulate only that certain outcomes—say, an increase in an allele’s 
frequency—do not come about because they are adaptive whilst other senses merely 
deny that certain outcomes are more probable than their alternatives. Yet, others 
instil an epistemological dimension in the concept, further complicating the issue.
1 These two groups are not mutually exclusive: for example, founder effects may fall under both catego-
ries.
2 This is approximately true, at least, according to the first edition of Origin, despite Darwin’s increased 
inclination towards a use-and-disuse theory in later life.
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So, whilst certain biological processes are taken to be ‘sources of contingency’ 
on the basis of their supposed chanciness (e.g. Travisano et  al. 1995; Beatty 
2006; Erwin 2006; Turner 2011; Powell 2009, 2012), it is not clear which sense 
of chance is invoked. This is particularly relevant because not all senses of chance 
actually engage with the assertations of an evolutionary contingency thesis. In 
other words, there are senses of chance that do not assert anything contrary to, for 
example, trivial (1 or 0) objective probabilities of evolutionary outcomes (Wong 
2020a) or that evolutionarily contingent outcomes are path dependent (Desjardins 
2011a, b, 2016). For example, if a process is chancy in the sense that one is igno-
rant of the outcomes that will result, then this says nothing about an outcome’s 
objective probability of evolution nor its path dependence. That is—one’s igno-
rance about which outcome will occur is compatible with an outcome having a 
high probability of occurence or its being not path dependent at all. Thus, even if 
chance variation or genetic drift are chancy in some senses, it may not be enough 
for these processes to be sources of contingency. In light of this complication, I 
am impelled to consider some of the ways in which chance variation and genetic 
drift can be said to be chancy.
Despite some other plausible sources of contingency, I will confine my focus in 
this paper to only these two microevolutionary factors: chance variation and genetic 
drift. The reason for this is that these factors have been emblematic of the contin-
gency debate (e.g. Beatty 2006; Powell 2012) and, therefore, benefit most from 
elucidation.
The plan of the present paper is as follows: I begin by offering a probabilistic con-
ception of a ‘source of contingency’. With this conception in mind, in the “Chance 
variation” section, I explicate the concepts of chance variation and genetic drift, both 
of which have had a long and convoluted history. In particular, I briefly consider 
Darwin’s usage of chance variation and then outline some of its modern equivalents: 
(1) random mutation and (2) recombination (in meiosis). Biologists and philoso-
phers have interpreted, at least, five different senses of chance for these processes. 
By way of evaluating the plausibility of each of these senses, I entertain some 
empirical evidence concerning mutagens, DNA repair mechanisms, and, mutational 
and recombinational hotspots. Although the empirical evidence is currently incon-
clusive regarding some senses of chance, I conclude that there is sufficient evidence 
that random mutations can be highly non-random in the statistical sense, such to 
render it a weak source of contingency at best. That is—many instances of mutagen-
esis result in an outcome that is relatively more probable than its alternatives.
The case is different with genetic drift, to which I turn in the “Genetic drift” sec-
tion. I shall argue that genetic drift as indiscriminate sampling is a maximally strong 
source of contingency on conceptual grounds. However, genetic drift as sampling 
error can be directional in a logically restricted sense. Regarding this, Stephens 
(2004) has argued that genetic drift as sampling error necessarily reaches homozy-
gosity given enough time. But, as we shall see, such restricted logical entailment 
about homozygosity does nothing to threaten ordinary specifications of evolutionary 
contingency. Thus, genetic drift as sampling error fails to constitute a source of con-
tingency only when it relates to certain contingency claims with idiosyncratically 
specificied subjects and/or unrealistic modal range indices.
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Given that these evolutionary factors can differ in directionality, it is important 
to note that sources of contingency seldomly exist in a vacuum. Sources of contin-
gency ought to be considered in the presence of other sources of contingency, and, 
what might be called, sources of directionality. Much like in a Newtonian frame-
work, whereby the determination of the movement of a ball succumbs to a variety 
of forces and their interactions, a source of contingency may be overridden or influ-
enced by other evolutionary factors. As a result, a genuine source of contingency 
may not always entail a highly evolutionarily contingent outcome if sources of direc-
tionality impinge. All of this shall be the topic of discussion in the “Sources of con-
tingency versus sources of directionality” section.
Finally, sources of contingency, as per the probabilistic conception, are highly 
amenable to quantitative analysis and empirical evaluation. In order to evaluate the 
strength of a source of contingency, a contingency-theorist may use an appropriate 
statistical measure that captures the collective differences of each combinatorically 
possible pair of probabilities in the possible outcome array. That is—an appropri-
ate measure would denote a level of equitability amongst all the possible outcomes 
of a source of contingency. Although there are a few statistical candidates, in  the 
“Shannon’s information entropy” section, I propose that Shannon’s (1948) informa-
tion entropy is most appropriate. Accordingly, as the probabilities of the outcomes 
in a possible outcome array differ less from each other (i.e. there is no one outcome 
that is relatively more probable to occur), entropy increases, and the source of con-
tingency is said to be stronger. On the other hand, if there is an outcome with a 
probability of 1 and, hence, entropy is equal to 0, then the source of contingency 
is at its absolute weakest (it is, in fact, a source of directionality). All in all, when 
there is sufficient frequency or probability data regarding a source of contingency, 
entropy can be calculated. This presents a bridge to empirical applicability. On this 
note, I end by considering a case of E. coli mutagenesis that is not only exemplary 
in illustrating how entropies can be calculated, but also how particular instances of 
mutagenesis can radically differ in strength amongst different variants of E. coli due 
to reasons that will come to make good biological sense.
Conceptualising sources of contingency
The term ‘sources of contingency’ has cropped up from time to time in the evolu-
tionary contingency literature and refers to a phenomenon or process that accounts 
for evolutionary contingency (e.g. Beatty 2006, 2008; Powell 2009; McConwell and 
Currie 2016). As for the idea of evolutionary contingency, minimally put, it asserts 
(amongst other things) that certain evolutionary outcomes could have been other-
wise. That is—one uniting feature amongst the different senses of contingency (e.g. 
Beatty 2006; Powell 2012; Desjardins 2011b; Wong 2020a) is that there is an evo-
lutionary ‘outcome’ that may not ‘necessarily’ occur. Whilst many contingency-the-
orists may differ on what kind of outcomes are at hand, particularly in light of the 
so-called ‘grain problem’, or how modally strong a contingency claim is meant to be 
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(e.g. contingent in all of evolutionary history or within more restricted contexts),3 
contingency-theorists agree that evolutionary contingency is about the objective 
evolution, or lack thereof, of outcomes. In other words, a contingency-theorist is not 
concerned with what an epistemic agent can predict about future evolutionary out-
comes given some set of facts. Rather, a contingency-theorist is concerned with the 
fact of the matter regarding whether an outcome will indeed evolve (or its tendency 
to evolve).4
Accordingly, a good concept of a source of contingency ought to fall on the right 
side of this objective versus epistemic distinction. This is particuarly important 
because, as we shall see, many senses of chance pertinent to random mutations or 
genetic drift are epistemic, and not objective. For this reason, a genuine source of 
contingency ought to be a phenomenon or process that results in an outcome that is 
objectively uncertain in its occurence.
Moreover, contingency-theorists have also emphasised that evolutionary con-
tingency can vary in degree (Beatty 2006; Desjardins 2011b; Powell 2012; Turner 
2011; Wong 2020a). One way in which evolutionarily contingent outcomes can vary 
in degree is for the sources of contingency, themselves, that account for these out-
comes to vary in degree.
These considerations suggest a conception of sources of contingency that is 
founded in objective probabilities. Firstly, it would allow for the concept to be able 
to straightforwardly satisfy the aforementioned objectivity requirement. Secondly, 
it would allow for sources to be able to vary in degree. However, sources of con-
tingency would not vary in degree by simply entailing a higher or lower probability 
for an outcome, but, rather, would vary according to how different in probability 
the possible outcomes are to each other. There is a population-level statistic that 
conveys the degree of bias towards any particular possible outcome (more on this 
later). Thirdly, a probabilistic construal of sources of contingency is in line with 
some major accounts of evolutionary contingency that employ (objective) prob-
abilities; namely, Powell and Mariscal (2015), Wong (2020a), Desjardins (2011b). 
These three accounts assert, respectively, that evolutionarily contingent events are 
some function of a low probability event, are of non-trivial probability themselves, 
or whose probabilities change as a result of previous events realised. A source of 
contingency that trades in probabilities is thus able to account for these features. 
Finally, and as the second half of this paper will soon speak to, chance variation and 
genetic drift naturally integrate with a probabilistic conception of sources of contin-
gency. After all, probability has been inherent within evolutionary biology, instan-
tiating within both chance variation and genetic drift. Empirical studies of random 
mutations and genetic drift often explicitly operate with probabilities. This natural 
intergration between sources of contingency, on the one hand, and chance variation 
and genetic drift, on the other hand, will be particularly useful when attempting to 
3 Wong (2020a) has suggested a systematic way of specifying contingency claims according to three 
dimensions: a subject, a modal range index, and the degree of contingency in terms of probability.
4 Contingency-theorists are sometimes interested in whether an outcome will evolve given a set of pre-
ceding causal conditions (e.g. sensitivity to initial conditions or path dependence).
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evaluate the strength of a source of contingency in real-world cases (c.f. “Shannon’s 
information entropy” section).
Accordingly, a source of contingency can be understood as a phenomenon or pro-
cess that leads to an outcome with less than an objective probability of 1. Whilst 
this may seem, at first glance, to be easily satisfied by any number of phenomena 
or processes (unless one were to absolutely reject non-trivial objective probabilities 
at the evolutionary level),5 the more pertinent question, when it comes to identify-
ing sources of contingency, is to what extent is a particular phenomenon or process 
a source of contingency. In other words, how strong or weak are they as sources of 
contingency?
There is more to be to said about this definition of sources of contingency: impor-
tantly, if an outcome does not have an objective probability of 1, then there exists, 
at least, one alternative outcome that has a probability greater than 0 (for discrete 
random variables). This is because objective probabilities must sum to 1. In other 
words, there is at least one other outcome that is possible from the earlier evolution-
ary state.
In fact, the preceding evolutionary state may lead to many possible outcomes 
insofar as the outcomes sum to 1. Let us call the string of possible outcomes, the 
possible outcome array where each outcome will have a non-zero objective prob-
ability. Accordingly, the array will also have a particular probability distribution 
specifying each outcome’s probability. That is—the distribution can take a uniform 
shape or a variety of non-uniform shapes. It is easy to see that the possible outcome 
array has, at least, two informative features. Firstly, it contains the number of pos-
sible outcomes reachable by a preceding or initial evolutionary state. Secondly, it 
specifies the objective probability of each possible outcome.
Consider the example, in Fig. 1, where O1 denotes an organism that can experi-
ence an array of four possible mutations with different objective probabilities that 
sum to 1 (adaptive values of the mutations are not of concern).
Fig. 1  Possible mutational 
outcome array
5 It may be tempting to think that, on account of physical determinism (if true), all events must have 
trivial (1 or 0) objective probabilities. However, my own opinion, and the opinion of many others (e.g. 
Loewer 2001; Hoefer 2007; Sober 2010; Strevens 2011; List and Pivato 2015), is that physical determin-
ism does not imply trivial probabilities for higher-level events, including those in biology and evolu-
tion. There is a sense of level-specificity with respect to objective probabilities due to different contrast 
classes.
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In this example, the process is an instance of mutagenesis since the outcomes 
are mutational. Now, the extent to which this instance of mutagenesis is a source 
of contingency is dependent on the two aforementioned features of the possible 
outcome array. From the supposition of probabilities, one can see that there is 
no outcome with an objective probability of 1 (and that there is more than one 
outcome). So, there is already some contingency in the example. But how much? 
This is partly determined by the existence of any bias(es) towards a particular 
outcome(s), or, in other words, the shape of the probability distribution. In this 
case, M2 is more probable than any of the other possible outcomes such that the 
probability distribution takes a non-uniform shape that is biased towards M2 . We 
may graphically represent this in the form of a histogram (Fig. 2).
However, probability distributions of possible outcome arrays need not have 
one peak but can have many peaks insofar as probabilities sum to 1. In techni-
cal parlance, they need not be uni-modal but can be multi-modal. There may be 
instances of mutagenesis or drift whereby one or two outcomes have significantly 
higher probability than the rest of the alternative outcomes. There would be a 
high level of contingency in this case because either of the two peak probability 
outcomes may result. Intuitively, this makes sense as there is not one outcome 
that is certain to come about even if many of the other outcomes are of low proba-
bility; there is still a great sense in which the outcome could have been otherwise.
In general, the strength of a source of contingency is determined by two fea-
tures: (1) the probability distribution of the array, and (2) and the number of pos-
sible outcomes. Firstly, a source of contingency can be strengthened by increas-
ing the number of possible outcomes in the array, ceteris paribus. That is—as the 
number of possible outcomes increases (more technically, as the cardinality of 
the range of a random variable increases), the objective probability of every out-
come decreases, ceteris paribus. For example, if there are 100 possible outcomes 
to drift or mutagenesis, then each outcome will have a lower probability than if 
there were 10 outcomes, all else being equal.
Secondly, if a source of contingency has absolute nil bias towards any particu-
lar outcome (i.e. uniform shape), then the differences between each and every 
probability value is minimised. For example, if there are 8 outcomes and if the 
distribution is absolutely uniform such that the difference between all and every 
probability value is 0, then the probability of each outcome is 1
8
 . In fact, the 
Fig. 2  Non-uniform distribution 
histogram
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objective probability of any outcome in a uniform distribution will be given by 1
n
 , 
where n is the number of possible outcomes. However, if the distribution is non-
uniform such that there is, at least, one peak, then the differences between each 
and every probability value (differences between the combinatorically possible 
pairs) will increase, and the source of contingency becomes weaker. After all, the 
probability of reaching those outcomes (i.e. the peaks) is higher than the 
alternatives.
Put in more intuitive terms, a source of contingency is stronger when there is a 
higher level of equitability between all the different possible outcomes—there is a 
sense that which outcome will occur is objectively uncertain. Conversely, a source 
of contingency is weak when there is an outcome that is relatively more probable 
to occur than alternative outcomes. Different instances of mutagenesis, drift, or 
any other candidate phenomena, for that matter, will likely differ in their strengths. 
But, part of the task of identifying sources of contingency involves determining the 
extent to which a phenomenon or process is a source of contingency, or, in other 
words, involves determining a candidate source’s degree of strength.
There are, indeed, systematic methods for directly quantifying the level of equi-
tability within the possible outcome array. But, in an effort to avoid overwhelming 
the present discussion, I shall defer and offer the statistical measure for assessing 
the strength of a source of contingency later in the “Shannon’s information entropy” 
section. For now, after having outlined the probabilistic conception, I turn to an 
examination of two groups of evolutionary factors that have been strongly suspected 
as being sources of contingency, starting with chance variation.
Chance variation
Prior to the modern synthesis, the attribution of chance was relegated to the first of 
a two-step process consisting of the generation of evolutionary variation and sub-
sequent natural selection acting on that variation. This was not to say that ‘chance’ 
was not significant enough to influence the outcome of forms, for Darwin’s Orchids 
(1862) showed precisely that the variations which ‘chanced’ to occur could very 
much determine ultimate forms (Beatty 2004, 2008). However, following the advent 
of genetic drift, Lady Luck’s fingers were no longer seen to be limited to the genera-
tion of variation, for chance had embodied itself via genetic drift as an alternative 
second step. In other words, by way of drift, chance was then seen as an alternative 
mode of evolutionary change to natural selection (Beatty 1984)6. In this section, I 
begin with Darwin’s usage of chance variation, followed by identifying five senses 
in which chance variation processes are taken to be ‘chancy’, ‘random’, or ‘acciden-
tal’ (terms used interchangeably in the literature). As we shall see, not all of these 
senses engage with evolutionary contingency.
6 More recently, Beatty (2016, 2019) has argued for the ‘creativity’ of natural selection in that selection 
can strongly influence the range of variations that can occur.
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Although the theory of evolution by natural selection is theoretically pillared on 
the concept of ‘chance variation’, Darwin did little to elaborate on which entities, 
units, or, objects of evolution were the ‘variants’ in Origin (1872). That is—there 
was initially no abstract theory of variation (Pence 2015, notes the same point). Dar-
win, at times, spoke generally of individual organisms (1859) varying by chance 
whilst Orchids (1862) contained instances in which he referred to the anatomical 
parts of different orchids as varying by chance. It was not until later when Darwin 
presented his theory of pangenesis (1868), positing the existence of gemmules, that 
Darwin had a more complete (though ultimately mistaken) theory of evolutionary 
change from inheritance to selection. The incipient idea was that gemmules were 
particles at the centre of an elaborate information transmission mechanism from 
parent to offspring but of particular significance is that, according to theory, the 
environment of the parents could influence the gemmules. Ironically, in this way, 
Darwin’s ‘chance variation’ allowed for his theory to become increasingly use-and-
disuse and was not so chancy after all7.
However, soon after the publication of the theory of pangenesis, Galton (1871) 
demonstrated, by way of experimentation on rabbits, that Darwin’s theory of 
pangenesis was mistaken. Consequently, the theory of pangenesis failed to gain 
traction and, over time, modern evolutionists have since abandoned this avenue of 
thought. Instead, following the turn of the century, the so-called modern synthesis 
authors began to recognise the cohesiveness of Mendelian genetics and Darwin’s 
theory of evolution by natural selection and thus, produced a series of works syn-
thesizing Mendelian genetics and Darwinism as a theory for biological evolutionary 
change. These works championed certain key ideas, which eventually came to form 
the crux of the modern synthesis.
One such idea is that evolution proceeds chiefly on genetic variations, which 
are either generated by random mutation or inherited from the previous genera-
tion—in some cases, only after a process of recombination. The latter refers to a 
process during meiosis (though recombination happens elsewhere), whereby chro-
mosomal material is reshuffled in one way or another, which has been theorised as 
an important catalyst in the production of variation in evolutionary history (Barton 
and Charlesworth 1998). Another idea, which has become a tenet of the modern 
synthesis, is that mutagenesis proceeds ‘randomly’. By proceeding ‘randomly’, the 
modern synthesis authors did not mean that there was no physical cause (determin-
istic or otherwise) to mutations nor that mutations were unaffected by environmental 
factors. After all, it was already well known during the synthesis that high energy 
radiations could induce mutations (e.g. Timoféeff-Ressovsky 1935). Rather, they 
attributed a very particular meaning to ‘random’—one that made sense within the 
theoretical confines of the modern synthesis. I shall come to explicate this sense in 
due course.
7 This is not to say that Darwin’s theory of pangenesis fails to contain any chance elements. Darwin 
allowed for chance modifications to gemmules when they congregate in gonads (1868).
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Random mutation
The sense in which the generation of mutations is random has been discussed 
by several authors in the philosophy of biology [Plutynski et  al. (2016) offers an 
impressive summary]. As a suitable point of departure, there is the Laplacean sense 
of ‘chance’ whereby mutations are perceived to be random as a result of one’s epis-
temic deficiencies in being able to identify the causes of mutations. The view is 
that there is some aetiology, albeit unknown to us, behind each and every mutation 
that fully accounts for their occurrence. Darwin, himself, at times advocated this 
Laplacean sense as evidenced by the following:
I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations ... had been due to 
chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, but it serves to 
acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular variation. 
[my emphasis added] (Darwin 1859)
There is no doubt that mutations can be random in the Laplacean sense. That is—
though we can sometimes offer compelling physico-chemical stories behind certain 
mutations (e.g. McClintock 1950), spelling out the aetiology behind mutations is 
often a molecular feat that is beyond our reach today (Sloan and Fogel 2011). How-
ever, the Laplacean sense does not entail that there is no systematic or non-uniform 
pattern in which mutations actually occur. In other words, although epistemic agents 
may be ignorant of the causes of mutations, there may very well be particular kinds 
of mutations that are more probable to occur. Hence, a concession to Laplacean 
ignorance does little to advance an attribution of directionality to random muta-
tions. Nor would it advance a denial of directionality either. That is—the Laplacean 
sense of chance also fails to entail any non-uniform pattern for the occurrence of 
mutations. It is simply neutral with respect to the fact of the matter regarding the 
directionality of mutations. In this way, the Laplacean sense of random mutations 
does not have any conceptual bearing on the processes of evolution: if mutations are 
construed to be random as a result of our ignorance of their causes, then this says 
nothing about the manner in which genetic variation is produced. Thus, even if ran-
dom mutations were chancy in the Laplacean sense, then this is no reason to think 
that it is a source of evolutionary contingency. In other words, it fails the objectivity 
requirement of a source of contingency.
On the other hand, the dominant sense of ‘random mutations’ in the modern 
synthesis has theoretical implications within evolutionary theory and, in particular, 
population genetics. In his consideration of the roles of natural selection and random 
mutation, Dobzhansky (1970) thought that mutations were random in the sense that 
whichever mutation occurred was indifferent to whether that mutation was “adap-
tive” (Ibid.) or evolutionarily fit. Or, as Beatty (1984) put it neatly, mutations are 
random with respect to fitness.8
8 This sense is not unique to the modern synthesis. For example, Darwin also employed this sense of 
chance (amongst the many others he also employed in his lifetime). However, it is nonetheless the domi-
nant sense of chance within the modern synthesis.
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There is, however, some ambiguity concerning how mutations are random with 
respect to evolutionary fitness. It is important to see that this modern synthesis 
sense does not mean that the probabilities of a beneficial, deleterious, and, neutral 
mutation are equiprobable. After all, Simpson (1944) and Dobzhansky et al. (1977) 
claimed that an organism that is poorly adapted to a new environment has a greater 
probability of experiencing a beneficial mutation rather than a deleterious one.9 
Rather, it was meant that a mutation did not occur because it would fulfil the adap-
tive needs of the organism. For example, being in a high temperature environment 
would not causally lead to mutations that are conducive to an organism’s heat toler-
ance. And so, the claim is a denial of any causal relationship (though my survey of 
the literature reveals that there is the occasional anti-statistical or anti-correlative 
claim). In other words, the modern synthesis sense of chance stipulates independ-
ence between random mutations and any adaptive benefits they may incur. In popu-
lation genetics, this sense meant that the mutations that occurred did not track fitness 
and so, any directional movement of a population through an adaptive landscape 
(sensu Wright) must be facilitated solely by other processes (e.g. natural selection). 
In fact, it was stated quite explicitly that random mutation alone was inadequate for 
any directional evolution towards fitness: “mutation alone, uncontrolled by natural 
selection, would result in the breakdown and eventual extinction of life, not in adap-
tive or progressive evolution” (Dobzhansky 1970, p. 65).
However, from the 1980s to 2000s, several papers appeared in the biological liter-
ature, which attempted to offer resistance against this sense of chance by appealing 
to, then, recent empirical evidence. This is pressing because if mutations are, indeed, 
directional towards adaption, then random mutations will fail to be sources of con-
tingency to the extent that mutagenesis will tend—for more or for less—to lead to 
the most adaptive mutational outcome(s). The greater the directionality towards 
adaptation, the weaker the source of contingency. Notable works of the resistance 
include Cairns et al. (1988), Shapiro (1999), and Jablonka and Lamb (2005), which 
cite studies that attempt to show that certain mutations, which are adaptive, occur 
more often than other mutations, which are less adaptive. Cairns et al. (1988) them-
selves replicate (with modifications) one of the experiments and, subsequently, inter-
preted their results to be supportive of directed mutagenesis towards adaptation.
Interestingly, of the studies cited (e.g. Shapiro 1984; Hall 1988; Benson 1988), 
there was one commonality: they were all experimental assays that compared (1) the 
mutation rate of a mutant in an induced environment in which it is beneficial with 
(2) the mutation rate of the same mutant in an environment in which it is not benefi-
cial. The rationale is that if the mutation rate was higher when it was beneficial than 
when it was not, then it can be concluded that mutations were directed toward adap-
tations. However, such a move is suspect as it pays no regard to certain methodologi-
cal issues or the existence of alternative explanations (Lenski and Mittler 1993). For 
example, a wholesale increase in mutation rates in only the ‘beneficial environment’ 
could produce a disparity in the mutation rates of the new mutant between the two 
9 The latter was, more recently, demonstrated by geometrical models in Orr (2005) and Martin and 
Lenormand (2006).
1 3
Sources of evolutionary contingency: chance variation and… Page 13 of 33 36
environments, but it would fall short of showing that the mutation occurred because 
it was adaptive. In other words, there would be an explanation of how the mutant 
had higher mutation rates in the environment in which it is beneficial, but the mutant 
would not have necessarily occurred because it was beneficial in that environment. 
As such, there needs to be an adequate demonstration of some causal link between 
adaptive need and a rise in mutation rates.
Moreover, in order to estimate the mutation rates, most of these studies employed 
a technique known as the ‘fluctuation test’. Ironically, the fluctuation test was first 
pioneered in a 1943 study, by Luria and Delbrück, which became the canonical 
defence for the modern synthesis tenet that mutations are random with respect to fit-
ness. Luria and Delbrück (and, indeed, many others) interpreted the results of their 
study to show that E. coli mutated phage resistance before exposure to bacteriophage 
and not after. And thus, it was concluded that mutations were not directed towards 
adaptive needs. Cairns et al. (1988), Shapiro (1999), and Jablonka and Lamb (2005) 
are aware of the Luria and Delbrück study but argue that the study failed to rule out 
the possibility of there being other mutations–mutations that are either different in 
kind, different in genome locale, or, present in different organisms—that are directed 
towards adaptation. In other words, they claim that it is, in principle, possible for 
sufficiently different mutations to be directed towards adaptation. Their point is that 
although the Luria and Delbrück experiment may have internal validity with respect 
to E. coli phage resistance, external validity is yet to be shown and, for this reason, 
directed mutagenesis may still be possible. Indeed, the three authors go further and 
claim that it is possible.
Lenski and Mittler (1993), in their evaluation of the studies, take a more reserved 
position and allege that there are methodological issues (including a lack of proper 
controls, the existence of alternative hypotheses, etc.) in all of the studies purporting 
directed mutagenesis. Their conclusion is that, for this reason, there is no compel-
ling case for directed mutagenesis as of yet. Merlin (2010) maintains a similar posi-
tion though her basis is on conceptual grounds rather than methodological grounds. 
She begins by defining the modern synthesis sense of random mutations as being 
an ‘evolutionary chance mutation’.10 And, a mutation is not an evolutionary chance 
mutation if and only if two conditions are fulfilled. In other words, a mutation is 
directed (towards adaptation) if and only if: 
1. the mutation is more probable in an environment where it is beneficial than in 
another environment where it is deleterious or neutral and,
2. the mutation is more probable in an environment where it is beneficial than other 
deleterious or neutral mutations (in the same environment) (Merlin 2010)
Given her schema, she takes all of the empirical cases purporting to show directed 
mutagenesis towards adaptation to fail satisfy, at least, one of the above condi-
tions (Merlin 2010). As such, in concordance with (Lenski and Mittler 1993), her 
10 This term is, precedingly, found in Eble (1999).
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conclusion is that current studies fail to show directed mutagenesis though this is 
not to say that directed mutagenesis towards adaptation is not possible.
The empirical studies landscape has changed little since (Merlin 2010). And, 
since the matter of directed mutagenesis toward adaptation is clearly an empiri-
cal issue to be settled by the work of biologists, I currently remain neutral with 
respect to the truth of directed mutagenesis towards adaptation. However, quite 
crucially, even if the truth of the modern synthesis sense of random mutations is 
undecided, there can be a failure of a different sense of chance that could threaten 
their candidacy as sources of contingency.
That is—even if there are no biases towards certain mutations on account of 
their fitness, certain non-uniform distributive patterns could nonetheless emerge. 
There can be particular mutations that are favoured on account of their physi-
cal differences albeit not their fitness differences. This is to say that, regardless 
of whether mutations are random with respect to fitness, the process of random 
mutations can be directional along some non-fitness, but nonetheless physical 
axis (i.e. towards certain physical attractors). If this is true, then random muta-
tions can result in particular kinds of mutational outcomes more often than its 
alternatives and hence, would fail to constitute a source of contingency to the 
appropriate extent. The greater the physical bias towards those outcomes, the 
weaker the source of contingency. There are, at least, two ways in which certain 
mutational outcomes can be physically favoured.
The first is that there may be an abundance of mutagens that induce specific muta-
tions such that the probability of occurrence of those mutations is higher than alter-
natives (regardless of fitness differences, if any). Mutagenesis is achieved mostly 
either via high energy radiations (e.g. UV light, X-Rays, etc.) or chemical alkylation 
agents. However, the former method is often ‘fat-fingered’ and induces all kinds of 
mutations such that there is little specificity as to which mutations occur (e.g. Tillich 
et al. 2012). In other words, although there is a wholesale increase in mutation rates 
following intervention, there is no particular mutation that occurs with greater rela-
tive probability.
There are both intuitive and abstract reasons for why a wholesale increase in 
mutation rates is insufficient for any sort of directionality. Intuitively put, if there was 
an increase in the mutation rates of all mutations, then there would be no direction-
ality towards any limited subset of mutational outcomes. In other words, a wholesale 
increase in mutation rates would not constitute a bias towards any particular kinds 
of mutations. Abstractly, and to invoke Merlin’s framework, her second condition 
clearly stipulates that the probability of a beneficial mutation must be greater than 
deleterious or neutral mutations in the same environment. In order words, it requires 
that directed mutagenesis encompass an occurrence bias towards particular muta-
tions (adaptive ones at that, for Merlin). An increase in mutation rates for all muta-
tions in an environment does not constitute a bias. It is also well known that a larger 
population or larger genome is conducive to higher absolute mutation rates (Wright 
1931). As such, a manipulation of population size would increase wholesale muta-
tion rates, but it would, however, not result in directionality since any subsequent 
rise in mutations will not be disproportionally towards certain mutational outcomes. 
Mutagens that incur wholesale mutation rates, alone, do nothing for directionality. 
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Mutagen specificity is imperative, lest there be no actual bias towards any particular 
mutational outcome.
Accordingly, one can consider examples whereby specific mutations are induced 
by mutagens. The chemical compound ethyl methanesulfonate has been demon-
strated to favour GC → AT  mutations (Coulondre and Miller 1977; Prakash and 
Sherman 1973) whilst aflatoxin B1 almost exclusively favours GC → TA transver-
sions (Aguilar et  al. 1993). These two mutagens result in specific mutations on 
account of certain, currently unarticulated, physio-chemical dispositions. In addi-
tion, one significant category of mutagens—base analogues—are, by their very 
nature, mutation specific. This is because the mechanism of their causing mutagen-
esis relies on recognising and binding to specific sequences of DNA, which thereby, 
block the ordinary binding of certain nitrogen bases. Instead, incorrect nucleotide 
sequences are then inserted opposite these base analogues during DNA replication.
Although the exact reasons for how mutagens induce specific mutations are not 
entirely known, their existences are well documented. But insofar as these mutagens 
exist, there will be a bias in the kinds of mutations that occur. The point is that it is 
possible for two mutations to have varying probabilities of occurrence due to their 
physical differences and mutagens discriminating according to those physical differ-
ences (regardless of fitness differences, if any).
Secondly, DNA error-checking mechanisms are also specific to certain muta-
tions (Dexheimer 2013). DNA error-checking mechanisms are molecular processes 
that recognise specific nucleotide sequences or deviations from specific nucleotide 
sequences and, subsequently, modify or destroy the sequence. These mechanisms 
enable fidelity in DNA replication but also maintain DNA functional integrity out-
side of replication. Accordingly, if these mechanisms are specific, then only cer-
tain types of mutations will be recognised and, subsequently, modified or destroyed 
(whilst others are left unaltered). This means that there will be a disproportionate 
number of a certain kind of mutation (i.e. those that are not recognised by the DNA 
error-checking mechanism). Thus, if two mutations had the same level of fitness but 
one was the target of the DNA error-checking mechanism due to some physical dif-
ference (i.e. nucleotide sequence), then their mutation rates will diverge.11
Moreover, DNA error-checking mechanisms can be downregulated in throughput 
to allow for an increase in mutation rates. These are the so-called mutator mecha-
nisms (Shapiro 1999). Certain microorganisms have been documented to possess 
mutator mechanisms, whereby it is hypothesised to be an evolutionary advantage to 
be able to modulate mutation rates on an as-needed basis (Díaz Arenas and Cooper 
2013).12 The rationale is that by increasing mutation rates, the (offspring of the) 
11 This, of course, turns on what the process of random mutation refers to. That is—there seems to be a 
fine line between the generation of a mutant and its perpetuation. However, current scientific usage takes 
mutations to be inclusive of failures in DNA replication. Hence, it is consistent to consider the efforts of 
DNA error checking to be antecedent to mutational outcome. Nor is my argument threatened by such a 
distinction, should it be made: if mutations are taken to strictly refer only to the generation of a mutant, 
then mutagen specificity would nonetheless be sufficient to entail the directionality of mutations in the 
non-equiprobable sense.
12 This would be one example of the so-called ‘evolution of evolvability’.
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bacterium is able to evade immune system defences (Richardson and Stojiljkovic 
1999; Ancel et  al. 2003). However, insofar as the regulation of mutation rates is 
specific to certain mutations, then there can be an imbalance of mutations—and one 
that need not track fitness. All in all, mutagen specificity and error-checking speci-
ficity show that certain mutations have a greater probability of occurring than other 
mutations due, not to their fitness differences, but to their physical differences. Natu-
rally, this leads us to the third sense in which mutations can be considered random.
Mutations are, sometimes, taken to be random with respect to physical differ-
ences. In other words, this sense asserts that there is no causal relationship between 
the mutagensis of certain variants and their physical properties. But, on the contrary, 
mutagen specificity and DNA error-checking specificity have shown this sense to 
be false. Certain mutations are more probable to occur due to its physical properties 
such as to be specifically induced by mutagens or to evade certain error-checking 
mechanisms.
It is important to note that to assert that mutations are random in this sense is 
equivalent to asserting that all mutations have equiprobable occurrence (insofar as 
one is a physicalist regarding mutations). For example, if a mutation were to occur 
at a specific locus and there were four different mutations possible, then each muta-
tional outcome has a 0.25 objective probability. This would mean that any physical 
differences between mutations could not entail that certain mutations are more prob-
able than their alternatives. This is the strongest sense of randomness encountered 
thus far since it asserts that any physical difference is irrelevant and, for this reason, 
denies the logically weaker senses including directionality towards adaptation.
Although mutagen specificity and DNA error-checking specificity show that 
mutations are not random with respect to physical differences, it is worthwhile to 
consider one commonly speculated way to lend support to this sense of random 
mutations. It involves an appeal to micro-level indeterminism and/or indeterminis-
tic quantum mechanics.13 Although Fisher did not provision a fully-fledged argu-
ment, his intuitions impelled him to endorse a “principle of indeterminism” (1934) 
for biology in the effort of uniting evolutionary biology with the physics of the time, 
which had already become increasingly indeterminist on account of Heisenberg 
(1927). On this note, following Sober’s (1984) lead, Brandon and Carson (1996) 
discuss indeterminism at the quantum level and consider the possibility of quantum 
indeterminism percolating up towards the level of mutations. The idea is that since 
quantum-level processes are inherently indeterministic according to the Copenha-
gen interpretation, the most micro of the evolutionary processes—random muta-
tions—must also be inherently indeterministic. In other words, the process by which 
mutations occur is ‘random’ because of lower-level quantum indeterminacy. These 
so-called percolation arguments continued to be championed thereafter (e.g. Rosen-
berg 2001a; Stamos 2001; Glymour 2001). However, given that there is difficulty in 
understanding the causes behind mutations, all of the pro-percolation authors con-
cede that it is not clear how percolation actually occurs; they assert only that random 
13 Glymour (2001) distinguishes between the two and argues for percolation only from micro-level inde-
terminism and remains indifferent to quantum mechanical considerations.
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mutations sufficiently resemble the quantum processes to merit indeterminacy. Oth-
ers vehemently argue against the percolation argument (see Sloan and Fogel 2011), 
and sever the link between the quantum-level and random mutations. All in all, the 
jury is still out on the plausibility of this sort of indeterministic chance.
However, even if indeterministic chance from the quantum level does percolate 
up to the level of mutations, it does not necessarily mean that mutations are ran-
dom with respect to physical differences. This depends on whether such indetermin-
istic chance is able to override certain sampling processes that are discriminate to 
physical differences such as the ones provisioned by mutagens in the environment or 
DNA error-checking mechanisms. In other words, there is no reason to suppose that 
quantum indeterminacy excludes those discriminate sampling processes. There is a 
coherent picture of the world whereby both consistently exist. As such, regardless of 
the outcome of the percolation argument, there is ample evidence (e.g. those dem-
onstrated above) that shows that mutations are not absolutely random with respect 
to physical differences. That is – there are mutagens that induce the occurrence of 
specific mutations and DNA error-checking mechanisms that block the occurrence 
of specific mutations, both on account of certain physical properties.
Contemporary biologists have increasingly become cognizant of the specificity of 
both mutagens and DNA error checking and, as a result, have distanced themselves 
from the modern synthesis orthodoxy of mutations being random with respect to 
physical differences (e.g. Loewe and Hill 2010; Rosenberg 2001b). There is a fifth 
interpretation, that has had some following in recent years, which is that mutations 
are random in the sense that there is no physical or chemical bias for where on the 
strands of DNA mutations occur (see Hartl and Clark 1989). In other words, the 
various loci (or however else they are segmented) on any given strand of DNA will 
have an equal probability of being a site of a mutation. Notice that this sense of ran-
domness is not mutually exclusive with any of the previous senses. Random muta-
tions may be chancy in the modern synthesis sense in virtue of this fifth sense.
In fact, the prevalence of this fifth sense is tenuously predicated on this being a 
biologically crude way of randomising the effects of mutations since the genes of 
each locus are assumed to have a specific phenotypic role(s)14 (Falconer and Mackay 
1996). However, this sense of random mutation is also false for there are observed 
mutation hotspots, which are positions within particular nucleotide sequences where 
there is a high probability of mutations occurring. The exact mechanisms behind the 
existence of these mutational hotpots are unclear, but there is a clear bias towards 
certain loci as the infamous Boer and Glickman study (1998) demonstrated in E. 
coli.
Having considered five senses of random mutation, there is reason to think muta-
tions fail to be chancy in, at least, two of these senses. Whilst the jury is still out on 
indeterministic chance and the modern synthesis sense of chance, it is empirically 
clear that certain mutations have greater probabilities of occurrence due to certain 
physical differences, and that mutations are more probable to occur in certain hot-
spot locales. For this reason, random mutations are not, paradigmatically, strong 
14 Indeed, this assumption is the basis for quantitative trait locus (QTL) analyses.
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sources of contingency; there are respects in which their strength as sources of con-
tingency is limited. Instances of mutagenesis do not always lead to equiprobable 
outcomes on account of certain physical biases, and are stronger or weaker sources 
of contingency depending upon the degree of bias. One may, more formally, evalu-
ate the degree of bias using statistical techniques, which I will come to describe 
in the “Shannon’s information entropy” section.
Recombination
Genetic recombination is a process within meiosis (as well as elsewhere) that results 
in new genetic variability in offspring due to a physical reshuffling, reorganisation, 
or, informational transfer of genetic material. More generally, recombination results 
in a transfer of genetic material between strands of DNA (typically, between differ-
ent chromosomes). As such, genetic recombination has a role in determining the 
genetic variability of individuals in a population, whereby subsequent processes like 
selection or drift are to act upon said material. However, there are reasons for why 
recombination fails to be ‘chancy’.
Like mutation hotspots, there are recombination hotspots, which are regions on 
the genome that have a greater probability of recombination than other regions. 
There is a significant amount of empirical evidence supporting the existence of 
these hotspots (e.g. Jeffreys and Neumann 2002). It has been theorised that there 
is an evolutionary advantage to recombination occurring more often where genes 
are present in higher concentration and occurring less often in areas of the genome 
where there is a lower density of genes (Barton and Charlesworth 1998). The idea 
is that, due to a plethora of molecular reasons, linkage disequilibrium can easily 
occur between two or more polymorphic sites that are undergoing selection. Any 
such disequilibrium would significantly disrupt selection. However, if there is higher 
rate of recombination at these sites (thus minimising linkage disequilibrium) then 
natural selection can work more efficiently (Hey 2004). Empirical studies confirm 
higher recombination rates in areas with high genetic density (Fullerton et al. 2001; 
Kong et al. 2002). Given that the existence of recombination hotspots is due to an 
evolutionary advantage, recombination is not random with respect to fitness and, a 
fortiori, it is also not random with respect to physical differences. For these reasons, 
recombination also fails to be a, paradigmatically, strong source of contingency. 
There are cases in which certain recombinational outcomes have a higher probabil-
ity of occuring than their alternatives.
To conclude this section, whilst the empirical data is inconclusive regarding 
whether random mutations are random with respect to fitness, this section showed 
that there are good reasons to believe that random mutations are not statistically ran-
dom. More specifically, mutagen specificity, DNA error-checking mechanism speci-
ficity, and mutational hotspots demonstrate that some mutational outcomes are more 
probable due to their physical dispositions.
If a process results in non-equiprobable outcomes, then it is a stronger or weaker 
source of contingency depending on the degree of bias or the amount of uncertainty 
at stake. For example, if an instance of mutagenesis is greatly biased towards one 
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mutant, then there is not much uncertainty as to which outcome will occur—the 
biased one is probable to occur. Strictly speaking, the reasons for a bias towards 
certain mutational outcomes may be plentiful. The reasons may be adaptive or non-
adaptive—but insofar as the process is biased to particular outcomes, then they 
oppose evolutionary contingency.
Genetic drift
There are a number of disparate processes and outcomes that have come to be 
known as genetic drift (Millstein (2016) provides a recent taxonomy). Not surpris-
ingly, some of the ‘chances’ of drift have already been encountered in the preceding 
discussion on chance variation. That is—some senses of chance apply commonly to 
both chance variation and genetic drift.
For one, biologists and philosophers have also interpreted genetic drift to be 
chancy in the Laplacean sense. Lande et al. (2003) take drift to “appear to be sto-
chastic or random in time reflecting our ignorance about the detailed causes of indi-
vidual mortality, reproduction or dispersal” [emphasis added]. Similarly, Rosenberg 
(1988, 1994) and Horan (1994) argued that there are no objective probabilities in 
evolution, but only subjective probabilities. For Rosenberg and Horan, since the pro-
cesses of evolution are deterministic, the probabilities of our theories of evolution 
are merely epistemic. And, as such, instances of genetic drift are really just bouts 
of deterministic selection masquerading as drift due to our ignorance about indi-
vidual births, deaths, etcetera. This sense of chance would not qualify genetic drift 
as a source of contingency due to a failure of the objectivity requirement. How-
ever, conceptual progress and the elucidation of the various species of genetic drift 
have largely dissipated this type of thinking anyways. For example, Rosenberg no 
longer thinks that all attributions of drift are due to epistemic ignorance since one 
species of drift—drift as sampling error—clearly trades in objective probabilities 
(Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004). The aim of this section is to consider whether 
some species of drift can be legitimately said to be sources of contingency. I shall 
conclude that genetic drift as indiscriminate sampling is a legitimate source of con-
tingency, whereas genetic drift as sampling error may or may not be, depending on 
the contingency claim at hand.
Genetic drift as indiscriminate sampling
Genetic drift has also been characterised as ‘indiscriminate parent sampling’ and 
‘indiscriminate gamete sampling’ (Beatty 1984). These processes are chancy due to 
their ostensibly indiscriminate nature. But there is another distinction that one can 
make, owing to a subtle ambiguity in the way in which parent and gamete sampling 
can be indiscriminate. In fact, this ambiguity is inherent in the biological and philo-
sophical literature, as some authors have clearly considered indiscriminate sampling 
as being indiscriminate to fitness differences (e.g. Shanahan 1992; Gildenhuys 2009; 
Okasha 2012; Pence 2017) whilst other authors refer to indiscriminate sampling as 
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indiscriminate to physical differences (e.g. Brandon and Carson 1996; Hodge 1987; 
Beatty 1984, 2002; Millstein 1997, 2002).
This distinction introduces some complications to the present inquiry into 
whether genetic drift as indiscriminate sampling is a source of contingency. But, 
as we shall see, the distinction (despite mirroring the distinction between two dif-
ferent senses of random mutation previously considered) does not ultimately carry 
over a difference as to whether the two types of indiscriminate sampling constitute 
sources of contingency. That is—both types of indiscriminate sampling are maxi-
mally strong sources of contingency.
By way of explaining indiscriminate sampling, Beatty (1984) offers a familiar 
contrast as a pedagogical device. He states that parents and gametes can be sampled 
discriminately according to their fitness differences, which just is the process of nat-
ural selection. After all, discriminate sampling is the process whereby certain parent 
individuals, who, for a multitude of possible reasons, are evolutionarily fitter than 
other parent individuals, and are able to better survive and/or reproduce than other 
parent individuals. Gametes may undergo a similar discriminate sampling process; 
that is—certain gametes may better survive and/or reproduce than other gametes on 
account of fitness differences.
On the other hand, genetic drift, for Beatty (1984), includes the processes by 
which these parents and gametes are sampled indiscriminately such that there are no 
particular (kinds of) parents or gametes that are favoured on account of their proper-
ties. Beatty (Ibid.) importantly specifies that it is physical properties that are of con-
cern; in other words, sampling is indiscriminate to physical differences as opposed 
to sampling that would be indiscriminate to fitness differences. But the latter is not 
entirely without instantiation. Motoo Kimura and the other neutralists invoked the 
latter sense when they maintained that drift was predominant because most molecu-
lar and/or genetic variants had no effect on phenotype (Kimura 1977). The neutral-
ists did not assert that molecular and/or genetic variants were physically indistin-
guishable, but indistinguishable only in phenotype and fitness (as they did not effect 
changes to these latter parameters).15
However, both drift as indiscriminate sampling to physical differences and 
indiscriminate sampling to fitness differences are sources of contingency. Firstly, 
sampling that is indiscriminate to physical differences is, a priori, non-direc-
tional. This is because, insofar as one is a physicalist about the units of evolution 
(e.g. individual parents, gametes, etc.), there is no way in which individual par-
ents or gametes are systematically sampled differentially given that the sampling 
process is blind to any physical differences. Any divergence from expectation 
would merely be consequential sampling error similar to the case of a fair coin 
that results in an unequal proportion of heads and tails (when the sample size 
is even). Genetic drift as indiscriminate sampling with respect to physical dif-
ferences, then, is a legitimate source of contingency and, indeed, maximally so 
for a given number of possible drift outcomes (keeping all other parameters the 
15 It may be also worth saying here that Ohta (1973) operationally included weak selection vis-a-vis 
drift, and not just absolute absence of selection, as neutral evolution.
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same). It is maximally strong because the outcomes that can result from such 
a process must have equal probability since the process is absolutely blind to 
any property individuals may have. In other words, every individual is on a par, 
probabilistically-speaking, with regard to their survival and/or reproduction.
What about sampling that is indiscriminate to fitness differences? There are 
some additional complications: whilst indiscriminate sampling with respect to 
physical differences is, a fortiori, also indiscriminate to fitness, there seems to 
be conceptual room for indiscriminate sampling with respect to fitness to be, 
at the same time, discriminate with respect to physical differences. This could 
mean that whilst a population of gametes or parents have the same fitness prop-
erties, they may possess physical differences that are sufficient to impel differ-
ential systematic treatment whereby certain parents or gametes survive and/or 
reproduce with greater probability than others. In other words, it might seem 
that drift as indiscriminate sampling with respect to fitness differences can result 
in an unrepresentative population on account of being discriminate to some 
physical property. That is—the sampling process may result in unrepresentative 
sampling along some physical dimension despite the process being indiscrimi-
nate with respect to fitness. As such, indiscriminate sampling with respect to fit-
ness differences would not necessarily constitute a source of contingency.
But such a scenario cannot ever obtain for good reason. If there are, indeed, 
physical properties that are sufficient to impel differential systematic treatment 
for the persistence and/or reproduction of parents or gametes, then it is also, ex 
hypothesi, a fitness property. This is because whether a property is one of fitness 
depends on whether it matters to its survival and/or reproduction. In cases where 
the sampling process, itself, pertains to survival or reproduction, then whatever 
property it is discriminate towards is necessarily one of fitness.
This is not to say that all physical properties are fitness properties for this 
would be absurd; for one, physical differences obtain in synonymous mutations 
but the same amino acid is nonetheless produced. And, in most cases, the differ-
ence of having an extra strand of hair could hardly matter to fitness. However, 
the point is that a physical property that impels differential treatment in sur-
vival or reproduction is, by definition, also a fitness property. Hence, if there 
is a sampling process (for persistence or reproduction) that is discriminate to 
those physical properties, then it is also a sampling process that is discriminate 
to fitness properties. In fact, it would just count as a case of natural selection. 
Contrapositively, if there is a sampling process (for persistence or reproduction) 
that is indiscriminate to fitness, then it is also indiscriminate to physical proper-
ties. Accordingly, although there may be a logical distinction between the two 
types of sampling processes, there is no empirical one insofar as the sampling 
is concerned with persistence and/or reproduction. Thus, just as drift as indis-
criminate sampling with respect to physics is a maximally strong source of con-
tingency, drift as indiscriminate sampling with respect to fitness is also a maxi-
mally strong source of contingency.
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Genetic drift as sampling error
Stephens (2004) argues that drift is directional because it eventually results in 
homozygosity. That is—given enough time, drift will fix one allele in the popula-
tion. In response, Brandon (2006) argues that this hardly constitutes directional-
ity since an epistemic agent could not possibly predict which allele will ultimately 
become fixed. Joining in on the debate, Filler (2009) argues that Stephens’ direction-
ality is a valid sense of directionality, but one that is logically weak.
Whilst I agree with Filler, it is clear that this logically weaker sense of direction-
ality (i.e. resulting in homozygosity) does not challenge ordinary specifications of 
evolutionary contingency. That is—although it asserts that there is a 1.0 probabil-
ity of reaching homozygosity (a certain type of outcome), that there will be some 
homozygosity is not an outcome that contingency-theorists are ordinarily concerned 
with. Wong (2019, 2020a) has argued that contingency theses ought to be fully 
specified according to dimensions of modal range and subject (i.e. the evolutionary 
outcome at hand). Following this framework, Stephens’ directionality of drift chal-
lenges only a contingency thesis with a narrowly-specified subject, and a very broad 
modal range with an unlimited time period. More specifically, it is concerned with 
a contingency thesis that asserts that heterozygotic outcomes could occur. Naturally, 
the evidential threshold of denying this thesis is low since, insofar as a process does 
not lead to heterozygosity eventually, then the process is not a source of contin-
gency. Thus, if directionality were to challenge a contingency thesis that is specified 
in a way to be interesting, then it must be logically stronger as to prescribe certain, 
logically stronger, evolutionary outcomes to a sufficiently greater probability (e.g. 
> 0.5 when there are only two outcomes). Else, genetic drift is not directional in an 
appropriate sense to threaten evolutionary contingency, ordinarily construed.
To sum up, genetic drift as indiscriminate sampling is a source of contingency 
and is maximally strong for a given number of possible drift outcomes. This is 
because these sampling processes are, a priori, statistically random. However, 
genetic drift as (consequent) sampling error can be directional in certain senses (i.e. 
aiming towards homozygosity). However, whether this directionality is enough to be 
in tension with contingency claims as to fail to constitute a source of contingency 
depends on how those contingency claims are specified in their modal range indices 
and outcomes.
Sources of contingency versus sources of directionality
Within a modal range, a legitimate source of contingency may not be sufficient to 
result in an outcome that is highly evolutionarily contingent. This is because sources 
of contingency will almost always be in the presence of other sources of contingency 
and/or, what might be called, sources of directionality though these are really just 
two sides of the same coin. An evolutionary factor is a source of directionality to the 
extent that it fails to be a source of contingency. The various sources of contingency 
and directionality will interact together in determining the total objective probability 
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of an outcome’s evolution.16 And, in some cases, a source of contingency can be 
overridden by a strong source of directionality.
An example of a strong source of directionality is artificial selection. So, sup-
pose that we encounter an instance of random mutation that is a genuine source of 
contingency. Despite its being a source of contingency, the resultant evolutionary 
outcome could eventually be abated by a source of directionality like artificial selec-
tion. That is—even after several bouts of random mutations in the population, arti-
ficial selection would just repeatedly ensure the survival and/or reproduction of a 
specific variant, regardless of the probability that the variant or its alternatives arise 
in the population. But the point is that just because a source of contingency is sub-
ject to some counteraction by a source of directionality does not mean there was no 
source of contingency in the first place. This is akin to how the displacement of a 
Newtonian ball can be dependent on a whole variety of forces, other than gravity, 
without having to exclude the existance of gravitational force. Much like Newtonian 
paradigm, the various sources of contingency and sources of directionality ought to 
be ‘summed’ together in order to determine the resultant outcome.
This sort of interactive pluralism is precisely the sort of spirit that Gould tried to 
invoke in his series of works condemning radical adaptationism (Gould 1977; Gould 
and Lewontin 1979). According to Gould, a “hardening” (1983) of the modern syn-
thesis has led to a systematic trivialisation of the processes of mutations, drift, and 
inheritance, whilst mistakenly placing increasing reverence on natural selection in 
determining form. Much has already been said by others about adaptationism and 
the critique of it but, for our purposes here, it should be fitting to point out that 
Gould’s mission was not to banish natural selection from good evolutionary theory, 
but merely to put some reigns on it. Natural selection and, for that matter, sources 
of contingency should be understood, not in isolation, but in an arena where there 
could very well be other evolutionary factors at hand. Just like the question of where 
a classic Newtonian ball would rest, we must consider the various factors at hand: 
gravity, wind resistance, lift, inertia, et cetera.
In this paper, I have considered only a handful of candidate sources of contin-
gency, but, in principle, there may be many more that impinge.17 The moral of the 
story is that the totality of sources of contingency and source of directionality must 
be considered in order to determine the evolutionary contingency of an outcome. To 
say merely that something is a source of contingency is not necessarily to say that 
its outcomes are evolutionarily contingent. Whether this is true depends on whether 
there are other factors at hand impinging.
But it is for this very reason that it may be sometimes difficult to ascertain 
whether an evolutionary factor is indeed a source of contingency or a source of 
directionality. That is—in some cases, there may be conflating factors. As is the 
norm in any physical kinematic study, the totality of forces must be decomposed 
17 One interesting project, beyond the scope of this paper, would be to produce a comprehensive tax-
onomy of sources of contingency and sources of directionality.
16 As the modal range increases, more sources of contingency and directionality will likely have to be 
taken into account in determining the total objective probability of evolution.
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into several factors, which may each have varying directionalities and magnitudes. 
Likewise, in order to test for sources of contingency and sources of directionality, 
they must be made the independent variable in some experimental way. The thought 
is to render a contended source in an ‘experimental vacuum’. Supposing that such 
sources can be isolated, we can calculate their strength of source using some formal 
statistical methods. This brings us to the next section.
Shannon’s information entropy
Under the probabilistic conception of a source of contingency, there were, notably, 
two properties that determined the strength of a source of contingency: (1) the prob-
ability distribution of the possible outcome array, and (2) the number of outcomes in 
that array. However, it was not clear how one was to quantify the strength of a source 
of contingency. Yet, this is part and parcel of the task of identifying sources of con-
tingency. And, moreover, it was not obvious how one is to compare the strengths 
of two different sources of contingency when they differed in one or more of these 
properties. That is—it was not easy to say whether a particular source of contin-
gency was stronger than another.
In this section, with the help of statistical methods, I offer a systematic means of 
determining the strength of a source of contingency. To begin, notice that both the 
probability distribution and the number of possible outcomes covaries with the col-
lective differences between each and every one of the probability values. The collec-
tive difference is the summation of all combinatorically possible values of a random 
variable X and, as such, some function of it denotes the equitability of a probabil-
ity distribution. As the shape diverges from uniformity, the collective differences 
increase. And, as the number of possible outcomes increase, so does the collective 
difference. Thus, an appropriate statistical measure for the strength of a source of 
contingency must be some function involving both the probability distribution and 
number of possible outcomes.
Following Shannon’s influential work in informational theory (1948), one can 
import a measure called information entropy (not thermodynamic entropy) for our 
purposes here since, as we shall see, it suffices to denote the strength of a source of 
contingency on account of fulfilling four criteria. Entropy has a marked history in 
informational theory, machine learning, and computer science as, under one valid 
interpretation, it constitutes the amount of information conveyed by revealing that 
a random variable X has a particular xi value. It has also been adapted into biologi-
cal and economical contexts. In the former, it is instantiated as the ‘Shannon index’, 
a widely taught statistic for ecological species diversity. However, in addition to 
being a measure of information conveyed or ecological species diversity, Shannon’s 
entropy is also an equally valid measure of uncertainty (the converse of equitabil-
ity), and so, suits the purposes here.
With respect to the aim of quantifying the strength of a source of contin-
gency, other statistical measures or so-called indices of diversity are inappro-
priate as they are either (1) concerned with differences from a central tendency 
(e.g. standard deviation, variance) and, as such, do not tell us the relationships of 
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each probability value to the other probability values, or, (2) tell us how often the 
probability values differ from each other [Perry and Kader’s unlikability measure 
(2005)]. Rather, what is desired is some measure of spread that answers the ques-
tion of how much each and every value in a probability distribution differ from 
each other. In other words, it ought to capture the magnitude of the differences of 
each probability value from the others. Abstractly put, it ought to satisfy the fol-
lowing four criteria: 
1. The measure is maximised when the probability distribution is uniform (i.e. the 
values are equiprobable).
2. The measure is minimised as the probability distribution diverges from uniform-
ity. In other words, as the probability values become less equitable, the measure 
minimises.
3. As n increases, the measure should also increase, ceteris paribus. e.g. a uniform 
probability distribution with n + 1 has higher entropy than a uniform entropy 
distribution with n.
4. Adding an outcome with 0 probability should not affect the measure. I.e. 
H(x1,… , xn) = H(x1,… , xn, 0)
Due to our specialised requirements, only one statistical measure, to my knowl-
edge, can perform such a task: Shannon’s information entropy as it fulfils all four 
requirements. To see this, consider its formulation (1948):
Firstly, it should be easy to see that a uniform probability distribution will have 
maximum entropy for a given number of outcomes. As established previously, 
each probability value in a uniform distribution will be 1
n
 , where n is the number 
of outcomes. So, x will be 1
n
 , and plugging in the numbers would give us the 
highest entropy for any given xi . When probabilities are equal, there is a maxi-
mum degree of uncertainty as to which outcome will occur. (This is the type of 
scenario embodied by genetic drift as indiscriminate sampling.) Criterion (1) is, 
therefore, met.
On the other hand, a probability distribution with only one outcome with a 
probability of 1 will have entropy of 0. In this case, no summation is needed since 
there is only one value. The p(x) would be 1, and the log of 1 is 0, therefore, 
H = 0 . Entropy is minimised when there is only one outcome. As such, probabil-
ity distributions in between absolute uniformity and absolute uni-modalism will 
have intermediate entropies. So, criterion (2) is also met.
Recall that taking into account the number of possible outcomes was also 
important. Entropy, unlike other measures, is able to do this since there will be an 
additional summation operation. So, as n increases, so does entropy. Abstractly, it 
does so by lowering the probabilities of the other values. So, criterion (3) is also 
fulfilled. Finally, if the probability distribution contains additional values of 0, 
H = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x)
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the entropy is not affected. This makes intuitive sense as a non-possible outcome 
should not affect the strength of a source of contingency. On the other hand, a 
measure like standard deviation would fail this condition.
To apply entropy, let us invoke the example of mutagenesis presented in  the 
“Chance variation” section, which had the following probability distribution:
As with this example, there is a bias towards M2 . But M2 is not certain. M1 , M3 , 
or M4 may arise though, objectively, M1 has a third of the probability of M2 , and 
double the probability than either M3 or M4 . After computing the above values, the 
entropy for this instance of mutagenesis is H(X) = ퟏ.ퟓퟕퟎퟗퟓ..18 Now, if one makes 
slight adjustments such that M1 and M2 are 0.4 each, and M3 and M4 are 0.1 each 
(multi-modal distribution), then the entropy is higher at H(X) = 1.72193. Since the 
second instance of mutagenesis has higher entropy than the first instance, the second 
instance is a stronger source of contingency. This makes sense as M2 , in the adjusted 
case, is less certain to occur on account of having lower probability and differing 
less from M1.
Notice that entropy, unlike standard deviation, is an absolute measure and does 
not vary from 0 to 1 (though there are methods to normalize). However, this is a 
virtue as because of this, entropy tells us how much uncertainty there is simpliciter 
regardless of the number of possible outcomes (i.e. n). This is imperative as it allows 
sources of contingency with different numbers of outcomes to be compared to each 
other. Some sources of contingency will have many possible outcomes, whereas oth-
ers will have few possible outcomes. Moreover, mathematically, this is the only way 
that criterion (3) can be fulfilled.
Finally, in the mutagenesis example, the probabilities are for categorical events 
(i.e. M1 , M2 , M3 , M4 ). So, unlike quantitative or continuous data sets, there is no 
one way to logically order the events. As such, the events on the X-axis can be re-
ordered and the histogram can look different. However, notice that regardless of any 
ordering, the level of entropy does not change as the probabilities themselves, or 
the differences to each other, have not changed. Some sources of contingency will 
have categorical datasets, whereas others may be quantitative which do not permit 
re-ordering. Either way, entropy is not influenced by order.
M1 = 0.2, M2 = 0.6, M3 = 0.1, M4 = 0.1
Table 1  Spectrum of base pair 
substitutions at A:T in wild-type 
and mutl- strain (Lee et al. 
2012)
Wild-type MutL-
A:T → G:C (transition) 49 1141
A:T → T:A (transversion) 17 14
A:T → C:G (transversion) 38 10
Total: 104 1165
18 H(X) = −[(0.2 log2 0.2) + (0.6 log2 0.6) + (0.1 log2 0.1) + (0.1 log2 0.1)] ; H(X) = −[(−0.464) + (−0.442)
+(−0.332) + (−0.332)] ; H(X) = −[−1.57095]
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Empirical applicability
With advancements in high-throughput sequencing, a number of recent studies have 
opted to investigate mutation spectra and mutational bias by sequencing the whole 
genomes of species. This approach relies on detecting the existence of single nucle-
otide polymorphisms or base pair substitutions of clonal populations (sometimes, 
only after some intervention like artificial bottlenecks to simulate drift or reduce the 
impact of selection) over several generations.
One study by Lee et  al. (2012) examined site specific mutational biases accu-
mulated over 3000 or 6000 generations in both wild-type and MutL-variants of E. 
coli. What they found was interesting: they recorded a strong bias towards certain 
mutants in the MutL-strain but a much weaker bias in the wild-type. They attributed 
such a difference in mutational bias to certain physio-chemical differences between 
the wild-type and the MutL- strain and the fact that the MutL-has a defective mis-
match repair mechanism.
Since their methodology did not include any means of figuring out the aetiol-
ogy behind mutational bias and included merely sequencing procedures, it cannot 
be inferred that the mutational bias was directional in the adaptation-tracking sense. 
This is, however, hardly a mark against their study as their chief concern was the 
presence of mutational bias. Rather, all that can be concluded was that there is direc-
tionality in the sense of non-equiprobability as the mutational biases demonstrate. 
And, in this respect, the study serves as a convincing example.
The authors recorded the number of different kind of mutations (including tran-
sitions and transversions) at A:T and G:C sites of both the wild-type E. coli and 
MutL-strain. Focusing only at the A:T site, there were a total of 104 mutations for 
the wild-type and, of substantial difference, 1,165 mutations for the MutL-. The 
mutations can be more finely represented in (Table 1).
Having been armed with Shannon’s information entropy, we can consider this 
study in order to evaluate the strength of the source of contingency. There are three 
possible outcomes from the initial state A : T. These include (1) G : C, (2) T : A, (3) 
C : G. Given the above frequency data, we can model two probability distributions 
for mutations at the A : T site for the wild-type and MutL-strain. This involves divid-
ing the frequency of a certain type of mutation by the total number of mutations for 
the wild-type and MutL-, respectively (Table 2).
With the probability distribution, one can then calculate the entropies for an 
instance of mutagenesis at the A  : T site for the wild-type and MutL-. Plugging in 
the values, gives us the following results:
Entropy of Mutations at A : T site of Wild-Type: 1.4693
Table 2  Probability distribution 
table Wild-type MutL-
G:C 0.4711 0.9793
T:A 0.1634 0.0120
C:G 0.3653 0.0086
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Entropy of Mutations at A : T site of MutL-: 0.1651
Not surprisingly, the entropy is very low for the MutL-as there is little uncertainty 
as to which outcome will result since the G : C outcome has a significantly greater 
probability than the other two alternatives. Lee et al. (2012) explain this by appeal-
ing to the fact that the MutL-, unlike the wild-type strain, has derived a defective 
error-checking mechanism and is thus, unable to check for replication errors. This 
also explains why the total number of mutations is substantially greater in the MutL-
strain. All these physio-chemical facts matter to how much, if any, certain biological 
processes are sources of contingency.
In general, Shannon’s information entropy provisions a means of assessing the 
strength of a source of contingency. Whilst the example employed pertained spe-
cifically to mutagenesis, it is important to note that Shannon’s information entropy 
is general and can be abstractly applied to any source of contingency. Fortunately, 
mutational, replicative, and experimental studies in biology are often informative of 
the objective probabilities of outcomes of a process. Given enough data (frequentist 
or otherwise), a probability distribution can be derived as to allow entropy to be 
calculated. The strength of sources of contingency can be empirically determined in 
this way.
Conclusion
Within contemporary evolutionary biology, it is not atypical to consider biological 
processes and their effects in terms of adaptive values: it is often asked, for instance, 
whether some biological process or outcome holds some interesting relationship 
with evolutionary fitness. This, perhaps, is a vestige of what Gould called the “hard-
ening of the modern synthesis” (1983). And although these questions constitute 
valid research enterprises, it is important not to neglect other legitimate biological 
questions. Detracting from fitness, biologists ought to also ask whether certain bio-
logical processes and outcomes hold relationships with certain non-fitness but phys-
ical properties that are nonetheless relevant to the evolution of form. For example, is 
it possible for mutations or drift to be influenced by, or directional towards, certain 
physical properties irrespective of fitness?
As we saw in this paper, both sets of questions matter for evolutionary contin-
gency theses. Regardless of whether the motivating factor for a high probability 
of an outcome was an attractor on a fitness landscape or a physical landscape, an 
attractor of either kind opposes evolutionary contingency. This, I take it, is what 
Jablonka and Lamb envisioned when they stated that: “[i]f some new variation is 
directed, then even if it is not adaptive, it could affect the direction of evolutionary 
change” (1995: p. 75).
Similarly, Eble (1999) noted that contemporary evolutionary biology encom-
passes a duality of chances—one pertaining to fitness (i.e. the so-called ‘evolu-
tionary’ meaning) and the other for all things non-fitness (i.e. a statistical mean-
ing). This paper has shown that particular processes of chance variation and genetic 
drift can be directional in the sense that there is a probabilistic bias towards certain 
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outcomes on account of their physical properties. Although there may be a multi-
tude of reasons for these biases, they are ultimately reflective of the physico-chem-
ical facts governing evolutionarily dynamical systems and the evolutionary trajec-
tories therein. One such fact that was encountered in this paper is the existence of 
a defective error-checking mechanism in the MutL-variant of E. coli., resulting in a 
tendency for A : T to G : C transitions. Indeed, there appears to be some directional-
ity to random mutations because of the way the world is19.
I wish to end this paper by highlighting the importance of identifying sources 
of contingency within the greater context of the study of evolutionary contingency. 
Sources of contingency play an explanatory role in that they constitute processes 
that give rise to instances of evolutionary contingency. That is—they allow contin-
gency-theorists to point to certain biological phenomena as explanations for the low 
objective probabilities of certain evolutionary outcomes. But being able to recognise 
sources of contingency is also evidentially important. Recognition of certain sources 
of contingency consists of attributing a probability distribution with an entropy 
greater than 0 to particular biological processes. Such a task also demonstrates that 
there is some evolutionary contingency at hand (insofar as these probabilities are not 
overridden). As such, sources of contingency can also act as evidence for contin-
gency. All in all, the hope is for the conceptual clarification provided in this paper to 
aid such tasks.
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